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Sacrifice and Sovereignty
Mateo Taussig-Rubbo*

They made the ultimate sacrifice and they are missed by their friends and families
-The Red Zone (Web site for private military contractors)'
and their clients.
Sacrifice seeks to establish a desired connection between two initially separate
-Claude Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind
domains.

In recent years, sacrifice is often discussed as the act that U.S. citizens have
not been asked to perform. Although many of our highest officials declare
that this is a time of war, the complete giving of the self- or its taking by
the government- that had come to characterize total war of the twentieth
century is absent. Sacrifice instead appears as a tactic that America's
2
adversaries employ when they martyr themselves. Even so, sacrifice and
sacralization are visible at sites like Ground Zero in New York and in the
public reception of the deaths of U.S. soldiers in war, and we can still
detect republican currents by which sacrifice and citizenship are mutually
constitutive, however attenuated or partisan these links might seem.3
One reason to focus on sacrifice is that it can be a register of the
government's dependence on the citizenry. Especially in the context of
• Associate Professor, University at Buffalo Law School, State University of New York.
1 The Red Zone military contractor Web site;' accessed Mar. 31, zoo6, http://psd-eod.
typepad.comldont_worrywell_protect_yohoos/o6/index.html.
2 Tala! Asad, On Suicide Bombing. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, 43-45, 51. Asad
acknowledges and criticizes the use of sacrifice as a widespread analytic to describe suicide
3

bombing.
For discussion of "sacralization" at Ground Zero see Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, "Sacred Property: Searching for Value in the Rubble of 9/u," at SSRN http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=l269533·
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war, in which citizens kill and are killed on behalf of the government, the
logic and rhetoric of sacrifice can function as a form of accountability. It
serves to ground a claim that a loss was of (or should have been) of great
significance. At the same time, because this accountability can verge on the
ephemeral, in many instances it might seem like little more than a cynical
screen for an underlying ability to demand or accept an offering without
giving compensation. What at one moment might look like a transcendent
act of sacrifice can at another come to seem like a purely pointless and
banal loss.
From the point of view of the citizen, the reasons to want to avoid
sacrifice are understandable, but it is also important to realize that the
government that avoids asking for sacrifice is in some sense declaring its
autonomy from the citizenry. Put another way, we have seen again and
again in U.S. history that citizens who can frame their losses as sacrifices
often gain a claim on the government and a means of showing that they are
part of the popular sovereign, "We the People." Seen in this light, a turn
away from sacrifice in the U.S. political and legal order constitutes a recalibration of relations between citizen and government that runs parallel to
the state of exception and governmental sovereignty. These developments
share ·a common theme: the independence of the government from the
citizenry in one case and the legal order in the other.
Rather than examine sacrifice as a category that pertains only to the barbaric other- such as the suicide bomber- I assume that it has been central
to the critical moments of founding, maintenance, and transformation of
the U.S. political and legal order. I d~ not undertake a deconstruction of
social contract theory, in which the preservation of the individual's life is
the purpose of the covenant, or liberal political thought, for which death is
nothing but negation, as unable to account for the actual place of sacrifice
in our political order. Paul Kahn, in his book Putting Liberalism in Its
Place, has already done this in a profound way; he has urged that that ·sacrifice and sovereignty must be considered together and that sacrifice and
not contract is the most accurate way of framing the political relationship
as it has been experienced.4 I take as a point of departure that the U.S.
government pursues not only a monopoly of violence but also a monopoly
4 Paul Kahn,

Putting Liberalism in Its Place. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005,
Ch. 5; see also Danielle Allen, Talking to Strangers: Anxieties of Citizenship Since Brown v.
Board of Education. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004, 39·
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of sacrifice - that is, control over sacralized, transcendent loss. In using
a vocabulary that has Christian (not to mention Jewish and Islamic) resonances, I do not mean to address the question of whether the state is
actually a church, nor do I propose to examine the reception of religious
meanings and forms by the political order in the founding moments of
political modernity, when sovereignty is redistributed from divine king to
the sacralized but ephemeral People. Rather, I seek to explore a form of
meaning of action that can be detected in a variety of present-day settings,
putting to the side the question of whether they are "religious" and/or
part of a "political theology"5 and draw instead on what the secular state
has designated as religious for what seem to be suggestive analogies (and
presumably homologies).
Having made these assumptions, what I actually explore in this essay
are efforts by officials, through law and policy, to avoid sacralization and
sacrifice, to unbundle the sacred and the state. More specifically, I describe
a state that uses legal form to attempt to construe certain deaths as sacrificial
and others as banal and meaningless in relation to a given audience. I
then· explore some of the difficulties that these attempts encounter as
nonstate actors employ and advance their own conceptions of sacrifice
and meaningful loss. In sum, 1'(1) suppose that the sovereign (either the
popular or the state sovereign and without specifying the relation between
these two and the government) is a ~acralized entity and that sacrifice is
central to the citizen's relation to the sovereign; (2) look at the attempts
that officials make to avoid this reality; and (3) describe nonstate actors
reasserting the importance of sacrifice and the sacred, but now as a form
of action and a resource that they command.
My first case study construes the emergence of the private military contractor in recent decades as an effort to displace or outsource sacrifice and
avoid engaging with the rich tradition that designates soldiers as participating in sacrifice. This attempt at desacralization, an attempt to render
certain deaths banal for a national audience, has encountered difficulties.
5

For discussions of these themes see Tala! Asad, Formations of the Secular; Christianity, Islam,
Modernity. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003, Ch. 1; Michael Taussig, The Magic of the
State. New York: Routledge, 1997; Winnifred Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters
on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schawb. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, [1922]
2006.
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I consider the U.S. reception of the spectacular televised killing and desecration of four contractors in Fallujah in 2004, where actors who had
contracted their security services to the private sector became resonceived
as sacralized citizens, their bodies a visible site for the idea of the nation.
In a second case study, I look at instances in which U.S. officials try to
"privatize" sacrifice by placing it in a gendered framework or making it
a "family matter," and the corresponding attempts of nonstate actors to
manipulate their private status. In a third case study, I turn to what might
be seen as sacrificial action by those deemed the enemies of the United
States, focusing on hunger strikes by detainees in Guanhinamo Bay, Cuba.
Detainees' attempts to turn themselves into martyrs - this is how military
officials and some detainees describe what they are doing - are blocked
by a counter-sacrificial policy by officials, including force-feeding and
increased secrecy.
Each of these cases concerns a legal form and policy - whether it
is contract and exclusion from military law jn the case of contractors,
the privatization of a mother's sacrifice, or exclusion from normal law in
Guantanamo -and the ways in which the meaning attributed to violence
and loss can attempt to overcome those classifications. My aim is not to
discuss comprehensively the theories of sacrifice; instead, I wish to point
out some important dynamics that merit more thorough investigation.
One theme that runs throughout this essay is the relation of sacrifice to
law and ritual. Ritual sacrifice often marks the sacrifice practiced by others
as alien for moderns, Christians, and post-Christians, for whom sacrifice
(if the category makes any sense at all) must be a sincere and heartfelt
giving of the self, not a formalistic and economistic act and not a giving of
a substitute in place of the self. 6 My examples are ones in which sacrificial
6 Many interpreters of our dominant religious traditions insist, like theorists of modern disen-

chantment, that ours is a postsacrificial era. For instance, many commentators describe archaic
shifts internal to the sacred Book from sacrifice to law in the Jewish case, or from sacrifice to
love in the Christian. Christ's "sacrifice" is a paradigm case where the body of an individual
is human, divine, and a stand-in for all "mankind," yet it is described as the last sacrifice,
the sacrifice of sacrifice. See Jean-Luc Nancy, "The Unsacrificeable," Yale French Studies,
79: 2o-38, 24 (1991); see also Jill Robbins, "Sacrifice," ed. Mark Talyor, Critical Tenns for
Religious Studies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998, 288. ("Both the figure of Christ
and Socrates propose a transfiguration and a transcendence of sacrifice. They determine it
as autosacrifice, namely, not only as sacrifice of the self that is willed and desired, but also,
it will be shown, self-sacrifice on its way to becoming the very sacrifice of sacrifice. They
determine it by a repetition of the old sacrifice that reveals an entirely new content, as when
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meaning appears in places where it is officially excluded, where it is more
improvisational and post hoc than ritually or legally permitted.
In my second epigraph, I quote anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss.
Levi-Strauss derided sacrifice as nonsensical because it confounded classification by asserting a connection between ordinarily separate categories such as individual person and god or cucumber and ox in a famous
anthropological example.? It blurred distinctions and hence, for the great
structuralist, meaning itself. Those moments of merging between different entities, the sacrificer and his or her god, surely can help to ground
authority. The technique of sacrifice, however, is not invariably tied to
law and ritual, nor is the monopoly by officials ensured - it can be taken
up by a variety of unauthorized actors. It is the potential nonsense of sacrifice, when in the hands of nonstate actors, that is especially interesting
in our current moment. The schemes of significance and insignificance
that law and policy designate (the soldier's death is a sacred presence of
the sovereign; the contractor's, banal) can be challenged by other actors.
From the perspective of the ex ante scheme, these assertions are indeed
nonsense, but ex post, in some of my examples, we can see that the structure oflegal and policy classification can begin to shift, or that officials will
have to take special action to preserve the status quo.
Finally, I must mention Giorgio Agamben's much-discussed conception of sovereign power as that which can take life without the action
being considered a sacrifice (or~ homicide). 8 Each of my examples could
be read as supporting Agamben's conception as a description of the government's ideal world, because it appears that sacrifice is the form of action
and meaning that officials generally attempt to displace. I would locate
Agamben's formulation not as describing a transcendent truth of modern
sovereignty but as one tentative effort to constitute actors whose death
the New Testament understands itself as the revelation of what was concealed in the Old. Both
claim to have acceded to the truth, hitherto concealed, of sacrifice. That is why, in the West,
the movement of going beyond, or the transcendence of sacrifice, is foundational.") See also
Jonathan Sheehan, "The Altars of the Idols: Religion, Sacrifice and the Early Modem Polity,"
Journal of the History of Ideas, 67,4:649-674 (:wo6).
7 Claude Levi-Strauss,
The Savage Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966, 224-228.
8 Giorgio Agamben, Homo
Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, 83. Agamben writes that the "sovereign sphere is the
sphere in which it is permitted to kill without committing homicide and without celebrating a
sacrifice, and sacred life [homo sacerJ - that is life which may be killed but not sacrificed - is
the life that has been captured in this sphere." (Italics in original.)
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is not a sacrifice (or a homicide). Although the main thrust of this piece is
the enormous difficulty that this encounters, the examples I have selected
are those in which we can detect an effort by the United States to be a
sovereign in Agamben's sense, to chart the course carefully between two
forms ofliability: the designation of a killing as a sacrifice or as a homicide.

Outsourcing Sacrifice and Private Military Contractors9
While stopped in traffic, several armed Iraqi insurgents walked up behind these
two unarmored vehicles and repeatedly shot these four Americans at point blank
range, dragged them from their vehicles, beat, burned and disfigured them and
-Plaintiffs Complaint, Nordan v. Blackwater
desecrated their remains. 10
[A mercenary is] motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire
for private gain ... material compensation substantially in excess of that promised
- Geneva Convention, Protocol1
or paid to combatants ... 11

This section examines one important example of the difficulties entailed
in creating a group of unsacrificeable subjects. This came early in the U.S.
war in Iraq, in March 2004, when four armed Blackwater contractors were
ambushed and then grotesquely and spectacularly killed, dismembered,
and immolated by hundreds of Iraqis in Fallujah. For many U.S. officials
and media commentators, these acts of"desecration," as many called them,
re-nationalized what had been privatized, and the deaths were conceived by
many as sacrifices on behalf of the United States. How are we to think about
this overcoming of the official insignificance attributed to the contractors'
deaths?
A Web site for private military contractors speaks of contractors whose
deaths were an "ultimate sacrifice" and "is dedicated to the men who
gave their lives so 'the client' would be safe." 12 In the military context,
This section is drawn from Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, "Outsourcing Sacrifice: The Labor of
Private Military Contractors," Yale Journal of Law 6 Humanities (forthcoming) (posted on
SSRN http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=u57399).
10 Plaintiffs Complaint, Nordan v. Blackwater, North Carolina, Wake County Superior Court,
7 No. os-CVS-ooo173 (filed Jan. 5, zoos) [hereinafter Complaint].
11 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12 1949 and Relating to the Protection
of Victims oflnternational Armed Conflict (Protocol I), Art. 47·
12 The Red Zone, supra note 1.
9
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we typically think of sacrifice as something that the soldier does for the
nation or state at least if we recall Lincoln at Gettysburg, when he speaks
of the "consecration" of the battlefield by those who "gave their lives that
[the] nation might live."13 As the military contractor quote might suggest,
however, the matter of who can sacrifice for whom is complicated: th~
nation is not the only purported recipient of this form of offering.
Indeed, killing by and the killing of armed private military contractors in
Iraq has drawn attention to their ill-defined legal and cultural position. Are
these contractors and their employers subject to Iraqi law, U.S. military
or criminal law, state tort law, or international law? Can they kill with
impunity? Can they be killed with impunity? By this I mean not whether
an Iraqi who kills a contractor would be immune from prosecution but
whether the killing of a contractor implicates the U.S. government in the
same way that the killing of a U.S. soldier does- that is, as a sacrifice for
the nation that officials and the public are expected to recognize, count,
and honor. Are the contractors, in sum, unable to commit murder and
ineligible for sacrifice? Do the legal form of contract and the policy of
privatization serve to immunize and dissociate the United States from
these forms of liability for those who act on its behalf?
Before addressing these questions, it is important to note that in the
United States, sacrifice and citizenship have long been seen as mutually constitutive: to forgo one is to disaggregate an ancient coupling. In
his notorious pre-Civil War opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford/4 Chief
Justice Taney evoked this tradition to buttress his position that Mrican
Americans were aliens, not citizens, referring to their exclusion from state
militias. He cited the laws of New Hampshire as one example according to
which
No one was permitted to be enrolled in the militia of the State, but
free white citizens .... Nothing could more strongly mark the entire
repudiation of the Mrican race. The alien is excluded, because, being
born in a foreign country, he cannot be a member of the community
until he is naturalized. But why are the Mrican race, born in the State,
not permitted to share in one of the highest duties of the citizen? The
answer is obvious; he is not, by the institutions and laws of the State,
13 Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in 7 Collected Works of Abraham
Lincoln, ed., Roy P. Basler. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953.
14
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 6o U.S. 393, 415 (1856).
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numbered among its people. He forms no part of the sovereignty of
the State, and is not therefore called on to uphold and defend it.
Although Taney's decision was rejected by the Civil War Amendments,
the assumption of the passage cited was not. Indeed, this same structure is at the heart of Lincoln's Gettysburg Address and Emancipation
Proclamation - except that the "state" that is receiving the sacrifice is now
the United States, not its member states. 15 Those excluded from military
service have understandably claimed that they are losing out on accessing
the particular prestige accorded to it,t6 whereas those who serve but are
not accorded full citizenship rights have found that their exclusion can be
challenged as violating the mutually constitutive nature of sacrifice and
citizenship.
Although this traditional citizen/sacrifice coupling is still visible, it is
also easy to see it as anemic - whether it has become weak because of a
"Vietnam gap" between the military and the rest of the population, the
end of conscription under President Nixon, or some other reason, such
as a diminished need for active mass participation in warfare. Many of
the cliches about and diagnoses of American society after World War II
suggest that America is a hedonistic, self-centered, consumer society
and that the traditional relationship of citizenship to military service is
disintegrating. 17 One commentator notes "a central paradox of present-day
American militarism. Even as U.S. policy in recent decades has become
progressively militarized, so too has the Vietnam-induced gap separating
the U.S. military from society persisted and perhaps even widened."18
15 Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in 7

Collected Works of Abraham
Lincoln, ed., Roy P. Basler. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953; Abraham
Lincoln, The Emancipation Proclamation (Jan. 1, 1863), available at www.archives.gov/
exhibits/featured_documents/emancipation_ proclamation/transcript.htm.

16 Elaine Scarry, "War and the Social Contract: Nuclear Policy, Distribution, and the Right to

Bear Arms," 139 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1257, 1308 (1991). Scarry notes: "The
logic of that coupling [civil rights and military obligations) is clear: from the earliest moments
of the republic to the most recent, the concept of the civil franchise has been inseparable from
the record of military participation."
17 Liz beth Cohen, A Consumers' Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America.
New York: Knopf, 2003.
18 Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2005, 28. Bacevich writes at 27: "For the generations that fought
the Civil War and the world wars, and even those who served in the 1950s and 196os, citizenship
and military service remained intimately linked. Indeed, those to whom this obligation to serve
did not apply- including at various times the poor, people of color, and women- were thereby
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Thus, the picture today is complicated. The roles of those giving and
receiving sacrifices for the nation are not clearly defined. We can see sacrifice invoked both as an inclusive practice and as an unfairly distributed
burden. Having said that, it remains the case that the soldier's sacrifice
remains, in U.S. public culture, remarkably sacrosanct, even though (or
because) military service is now voluntary and enlistment is openly promoted as providing educational and other benefits. Officials are expected
to honor the deaths of soldiers, and their failure to do so is easily turned
into a scandal.
It is in relation to this structure, by which soldiers are recognized for
their sacrifice, that I wish to locate the private military contractor. There
are many reasons to think that contractors' deaths are not sacrifices, most
obviously because they are motivated by private gain, not national service.
Thus it may be said that they are mercenaries whose deaths do not resonate with a broader national audience. 19 Contractors are not included in
the overall troop figures, even though at present in Iraq they are almost
at parity. 20 Their deaths are not included in the daily body count of soldiers (by one estimate they have been killed at a rate one fourth that of
U.S. soldiers), nor are they given medals, pensions, or public honor. 21

19

20

21

•

marked as ineligible for full citizenship ... In our own time, all of that has changed ... There
is a simple explanation for this fact. As with so many other aspects of life in contemporary
America, military service has become strictly a matter of individual choice."
For an argument that contractors should often be seen as mercenaries, see Zoe Salzman,
"Private Military Contractors and the Taint of Mercenary Reputation," New York University
Journal of International Law 6 Policy (2oo8) 40: 874-891. Protocol I provides that mercenaries
"shall not have the right to be a combatant or prisoner of war." Protocol I, art. 47(1). It defines a
mercenary as "one who (a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed
conflict; (b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; (c) is motivated to take part in the
hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of
a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid
to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party; (d) is neither a
national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and (f) has not been sent by
a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces."
John M. Broder and James Risen, "Contractor Deaths in Iraq Soar to Record," The New York
Times, May 19, 2007 (noting that almost "3oo companies from the United States and around
the world supply workers who are a shadow force in Iraq almost as large as the uniformed
military.... about 126,ooo men and women working for contractors serve alongside about
15o,ooo American troops, the Pentagon has reported").
Ibid. (estimating that 917 contractors had been killed in Iraq). Only a small portion of the total
number of contractors are armed - but of that smaller group, there might be mortality rates
higher than those of soldiers. Moreover, because the deaths of non-U.S. citizen contractors
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(In fact, individual contractors have accepted medals from the United
States, including Bronze Stars and Purple Hearts, in recognition of their
service. When it was discovered that the recipients were contractors, however, the medals were retracted. 22 ) To emphasize their exclusion from
sacrificial logics, we need only point out that there is a Tomb of the
Unknown Soldier but none for the Unknown Contractor. 2 3
We might infer that for theU.S. government and the American public
more generally, the contractor's death is neither offered nor received as a
"sacrifice." This sense is strengthened when we reflect on the intellectual
pedigree that surrounds the turn to private military contractors, that is,
ideas associated with privatization, outsourcing, or neoliberalism. These
lines of thought and argument are, to say the least, skeptical of public
spiritedness as a firm ground on which to build government policy, and
for which the very notion of sacrifice might be analytically impossible
or morally abhorrent, because sacrifice entails a giving of the inalienable
self.24
Contractor firms got their first significant entree into U.S. foreign policy
under President Clinton, who did not want to pay the political cost of sending 9,000 reservists to the Balkans. It has been under President George W.
Bush (and Vice President Dick Cheney, former head of contracting giant
Halliburton) that the move to contractors has accelerated exponentially. 2 5

are not, under U.S. Deparhnent of Labor rules, required to be reported, there may be underreporting of that category. See Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in
Iraq. New York: Penguin, 2007, 37o-371.
22 Renae Merle, "Contract Workers Are War's Forgotten: Iraq Deaths Create Subculture of
Loss," Washington Post, July 31, 2004. A1; see also Ariana Eunjung Cha and Renae Merle,
"Line Increasingly Blurred between Soldiers and Civilian Contractors," The Washington Post,
May 13, 2004 (the Pentagon mistakenly awarded honors to contractors).
23 To adapt Benedict Anderson's observation. Anderson, in insisting on the national nature
of Tombs to the Unknown Soldiers, writes: "The cultural significance of such monuments
becomes even clearer if one tries to imagine, say, a Tomb of the Unknown Marxist or a
cenotaph for fallen Liberals. Is a sense of absurdity unavoidable?" Benedict Anderson, Imagined
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. New York: Verso 1991, 10.
2
'~ See, for example, Milton Friedman's complaint about President Kennedy's famous line from
his inaugural address-"Ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your
country." Friedman objected: "The organismic, 'what you can do for your country' implies that
government is the master or deity, the citizen the servant or votary." Milton Friedman (with
the assistance of Rose Friedman), Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1962, 1.
25 Peter Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2003, 6, 208--209.
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I want to suggest that the turn to the military contractor represents an
attempt by officials to designate, by law and policy, a class of persons
whose deaths will be banal and insignificant to a national audience. Their
existence and relation to the body politic is one of contract, not sacrifice.
As mentioned, among contractors another position can be detected. For
the contractors themselves, as well as for their employers and their families,
their deaths might indeed be described as "sacrifices" for the company.
A journalist recounts that Blackwater has created something of a miniArlington at its corporate headquarters: a "memorial rock garden on their
compound in Moyock, NC, where each contractor that has been killed
while serving the company is given a stone with their name engraved on
it."26 The use of contractors can thus be called an outsourcing of sacrificesacrifice takes place, but the significance is removed from the purview of
the government and the public and is contained within the private sphere
of the family and the company. This view rejects the assumption that
sacrifice can exist only for the nation, that the state monopolizes not only
legitimate violence, as Max Weber urged, but sacrifice as well. 2 7
A third and more startling view, which can be detected in the reception
and classification of deaths of U.S. citizen contractors (there are but a few
examples of it extending to noncitizens 28 ) by the United States, is that
the contractors' deaths not only are sacrifices for the employer but also
sacrifices to and for the United States. This view, which President Bush
has expressed, owes much to the attack on the contractors in Fallujah. 2 9
The sacrifice is still "outsourced" in the sense that it is not performed by
26 Bill Sizemore, "Suit Against Blackwater Over Contractor Goes to Arbitration,"

27

The VirginiaPilot, May 20,2007.
Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, eds., H. H. Gerth

and C. Wright Mills, trans. 1958), 78 ("[A] state is a human community that (successfully)
claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force.").
28 One example of the recognition of the sacrifices of noncitizen contractors may be seen in 2oo8
when five Fijian contractors who died in Iraq were awarded the Defense of Freedom medal,
the medal specially created to honor the civilian victims of 9/n at the Pentagon. The U.S.
Embassy representative explained to the Fiii Times that "the ceremony was to honour the five
men who bravely laid down their lives as part of an international effort to fight terrorism and
create freedom." See Monica Singh, Local War Casualties Get Medals, Fiji Times Online,
August 15, 2008, at www.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?id=9787o.
29 President Bush, commenting on investigations into Blackwater for shooting civilians in
September 2007, said, "I will be anxious to see the analysis of their performance," and "There's
a lot of studying going on, both inside Iraq and out, as to whether or not people violated rules
of engagement. I will tell you, though, that a firm like Blackwater provides a valuable service.
They protect people's lives, and I appreciate the sacrifice and the service that the Blackwater
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people wearing the marks of the sovereign- the uniform or the flag- but
it is not outsourced in the sense that the deaths are seen, recognized, and
honored by the United States, albeit in an ad hoc and after the fact manner.
The state, nation, or public returns as the recipient of the sacrifice, rejecting
the opposition between monetary self-interest and national service.
One event that challenged the initial policy move of desacralization
was the grotesque and spectacular killing of four Blackwater contractors
in March 2004 in Fallujah. Although these contractors had contracted
their security services to the private sector, they became reconceived as
sacralized citizens, their bodies a visible site for the idea of the nation.
The contractors had each entered into an independent contractor service
agreement with Blackwater, and they were to provide security and logistical
support to ESS Support Services Worldwide, which in turn had contracted
with Kellog, Brown & Root, which further had contracted with the U.S.
Army.3°
On March 30, the four contractors were sent on a mission to escort
three ESS kitchen supply trucks to a military base. Without maps, with no
familiarity of the area, and with no logistical support, the convoy got lost,
and on the second day all four were killed. Blackwater's account of the
attack emphasized that the contractors were targeted as Americans: "The
ESS truck drivers- all third country nationals- were intentionally spared
and left to escape ... The ambush, apparently, was only intended to kill
the Americans."31
Amid great public excitement and drawing a crowd numbering in
the hundreds, the contractors were dragged through the streets behind
a vehicle, torn limb from limb, and immolated. Finally, portions of two of
the contractors' bodies were hung on a bridge over the Euphrates River.
Denunciations of the United States and the burning of the American flag
accompanied the attack. Videotaped and disseminated to media outlets,
employees have made." See Associated Press, Blackwater Will Probably Leave Iraq, Officials
Say. Oct. 17, 2007. Available at www.msnbc.msn.com/idh1352794·
30 In the Complaint filed by the Estates of the contract workers, at 7-10, the contractual structure
is described.
31 Blackwater emphasized that the cause of the incident was betrayal by Iraqi forces, not its
own incompetence. "Blackwater's Response to 'Majority Staff Report' on 'Private Military
Contractors in Iraq: An Examination of Blackwater's Actions in Fallujah." Not dated or signed;
released in Oct. 2007 at 3·
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the event dominated the print and television news in the United States,32
conjuring an atmospherics entirely different from the "shock and awe"
phase of the war.
Immediately after the attacks, officials and mainstream media commenc
tators in the United States compared the deaths to those of the U.S. Army
Rangers killed and desecrated in Somalia during the Clinton presidency.
The fear of a repeat performance, the "Mogadishu effect," was no doubt
important to officials who had subsequently made timely extraction of
injured soldiers pivotal to their protocols -recognizing that the body of
the soldier was an invaluable canvas on which to work.33 What is remarkable, given our assumption that the contractor is ineligible for sacrifice,
is the ease with which the contractors were assimilated to a consecrated
status.34
Four days later, at the direction of the White House and the Secretary of
Defense, military officials on the ground were ordered to invade the city,
over the objections of on-site commanders.35 Even though military officials
were extremely critical of the fact that while the contractors represented the
United States to Iraqis, they (the military) had very little control over the
contractors, and despite envy and animosity between ordinary soldiers and
contractors, the Marines named the bridge where the bodies were hung
"Blackwater Bridge." The U.S. siege of the city lead to approximately 8oo
Iraqi civilian deaths.3 6 The insurgents managed to hold the city, which
32
33

Images of the attack ran on the front page of The New York Times, USA Today, and The
Washington Post. The publication of the gruesome images was itself a topic of debate.
Gwynne Dyer, "The Fallujah Effect," Pittsburgh Post-Ga:zette, Apr. 4, 2004 ("'n the mid-9os
there used to be something called the 'Mogadishu line' which the U.S. military were never
supposed to cross. Rounding up from the 18 U.S. soldiers who were killed in one day in

Mogadishu in 1993, it was a doctrine which stated that the U.S. armed forces should undertake
no overseas mission that was likely to cause the deaths of more than 20 American soldiers
except when vital national interests were involved.").
34 William Kristol, "After
Fallujah," The Weekly Standard, Apr. 12, 2004 ("The similarity struck
everyone right away: Mogadishu, October 3, 1993; Fallujah, March 31, 2004. But we cannot
permit these two outrages to be similar in their effect." According to Kristol, Mogadishu had
led to the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia and to genocide in Rwanda. To "properly honor[] the
sacrifice of those who died on March 31 in Fallujah" the U.S. should "deepen" its "commitment
to victory" and act aggressively against hostile residents).
35 Ricks,
Fiasco, 332-333.
36 Jeremy Scahill,
Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army. New York:
Nation Books, 2007, 143·
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itself marked a major turning point, showing that the United States could
be fought to a standstill)?
From what we know of the perspective of the attackers, the event is full
of sacrificial thematics and evinces a complex global exchange. According
to one account, some participants declared that 'With our blood and
our souls, we will sacrifice for Islam," and one resident compared the
contractors bodies, dangling from the bridge, to "slaughtered sheep"- one
archetypal sacrificial victim.38 Nir Rosen described the attacks as part of
a standardized routine: "There is a word for this sort of thing. In Iraqi
dialect, the Arabic word sahl, which literally means dragging a body down
the street, has grown to mean any sort of public massacre."39 In another
report, the Brigades of Martyr Ahmed Yassin claimed authorship of the
attack, describing it as "a gift from the people ofFallujah to the people of
Palestine and the family of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin who was assassinated by
the criminal Zionists."4°
The sacrificial status of the victims (as contrasted with the perpetrators)
of terrorist and insurgent violence has received little attention, although
Arjun Appadurai has described the genre of the videotaped beheading of
kidnapping victims, starting with that of journalist Daniel Pearl, as a "public sacrifice."41 Whether the Iraqis were making a conscious reference to
their own traditions of sacrifice in their mode of killing the contractors, for
the American officials the attackers released the latent sacrificial potential
of the contractors as American citizens. To make an analogy to the law of
business organizations, the attack pierced the veil of contractual intermediaries, making visible for Americans the displaced tie between themselves
and the contractors.
37 Ricks,

Fiasco: 344·

38 Scahill, Blackwater, 103.
39 Nir Rosen, "Home Rule," July 5, 2004, The
40

New Yorker.

john Lee Anderson, "Letter from Baghdad," The New Yorker, May 3, 2004, p. 63.
41 Arjun Appadurai, Fear of Small Numbers. Durham: Duke University Press, 2oo6, 12. See Faisal
Devji, Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2005, 96. Devji writes: "Indeed, there is a sense in which even the jihad's enemies- or
victims - come to participate in the rites of martyrdom by dying alongside its suicide bombers
in spectacular set-pieces like the attacks of 9/u. This may explain why supporters of the jihad
are forever drawing parallels between its own dead and those of its enemies, because both
coalesce in a community of martyrdom made possible by the virtual intimacy of the media,
which allows each party to exchange words and deeds with the other."
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If we ask what went wrong with the effort of the United States to displace
sacrificial meaning, we must turn to the attackers' specific framing of their
assault as one on the United States. As important as the communications
infrastructure of a hand-held video recorder and distribution was - and
it was clearly essential - we should not let a focus on the technology
overshadow the content of what was communicated and which message
was received. To understand these, we must have recourse to American
popular sovereignty, which, as Kahn puts it, "tells us that we- each of usare the popular sovereign, that our bodies constitute its body."42 It was
precisely this location of sovereignty in the body of the individual citizen
that is credited for the restriction of mercenary activity by the United States
through neutrality laws shortly after the revolution. This distribution of
sovereignty made it increasingly difficult for states to deny responsibility
for or identification with the violence employed by their citizens abroadbe that mercenary, filibuster, privateer, or pirate violence. Doing ·so was
"inconsistent with view that sovereignty came not from God through the
monarch but from man or the citizen himself. With the individual citizen
as the ostensible source of sovereignty, the state could no longer disclaim
responsibility for his violent activities in the international system."43 In
destroying the contractors' bodies, the Fallujah attackers simultaneously
gave them back to the United States as citizens. To avoid sacrifice more
successfully, policy makers should not employ U.S. citizens, and yet doing
so would bolster claims that the contractors are mercenaries.
The notion of sacrifice does not entirely grasp the provocative quality of
the action in Fallujah- although the literal meaning of the word sacrifice,
to "make sacred," seems on point so far as the reception by the United
States is concerned. After all, the attack was aimed at someone ,else's sacred
character; it was a "desecration." Desecration, however, entails destroying
something already sacred - as in the cases of "Koran desecration" or in
the proposed constitutional amendment banning the "desecration" of the
42

Kahn, Putting Liberalism in Its Place, 246.

43 Janice Thomson,

Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns; State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modem Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. 148. Thomson

describes the controversy over mercenaries who sold their labor on the international market
as posing the question of whether the mercenary was "a market actor, pursuing private ends
through the sale of his labor? Or was he a political actor for whose actions his home state could
be held accountable?" (55).
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U.S. flag. Given that one of the attractions of military contract workers is
that they are not located as sacred characters - unlike the soldier in the
armed forces, whose death is officially a national loss - the reception of
the event entailed a resacralization (seeing the contractors as citizens, as
belonging to the sovereign).44 Not only did the Fallujah killing bring added
scrutiny to the contractor sector, it also helped to legitimate it. Like soldiers,
contractors could have national meanings inscribed on their bodies. The
Fallujah case showed that the dichotomy between the contractor and
sacrifice could be transcended: relations could be both contractual and
sacrificial.
Sacrifice is often described as action contained within ritual and legal
formats and is thus formalized and institutionalized. In this incident it
emerges as an assertion, a claim that cuts across the legal order advanced by
the United States. The designation of"sacrifice" is essentially retrospective.
Compared with sacrifice that is contained by the state, exemplified by war
memorials, this is unexpected and entrepreneurial.
Despite the moment of consecration and the assimilation of the contractors to the high status enjoyed by the victims of the attack in Somalia,
the event did not, of course, legally transform killed contractors into killed
soldiers. The families of the Fallujah contractors, remaining legally in the
domain of contract and tort law, brought·a fraud and wrongful death suit
against Blackwater in North Carolina state court. Blackwater has vigorously sought to avoid facing a group of local jurors, which might award
alarge punitive damages award. The soldier, compensated with recognition for "sacrifice" - honor, medals, and other benefits of the regulatory
state, is generally excluded from state and federal courts. (This exclusion
is but a part of the overall transformation of the soldier's status to something closer to a possession of the United States. Whereas the contractor
can quit, the soldier who leaves can, under certain circumstances, be
44 For an examination of the importance of negation in creating the sacred, see Michael Taussig,

Defacement: Public Secrecy and the Labor of the Negative. Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1999, 13. Taussig writes: "Around me there is no sacrifice, nor much passion for sacred things.
The disenchantment of the world still seems to me a largely accomplished fact. What exists
now is perhaps best thought of as a new amalgam of enchantment and disenchantment, the
sacred existing in muted but powerful forms, especially- and this is my central preoccupationin its negative form as desecration." I would suggest that there remain in U.S. political culture
official sites of the sacred- the Constitution and other manifestations of the popular sovereigneven in the absence of" desecration."
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killed for desertion. The soldier's enlistment contract is akin to what Max
Weber described as a "status contract," which is what some courts call it as
well.)45
Despite its founder Erik Prince's claim, to want to be the military services
version of Federal Express, Blackwater's response to the litigation reveals
that in some respects the company does not want to be a private actor.46
Blackwater has argued that because war is essentially a federal function,
the claim should not be reviewed by state courts and attempted to shift the
litigation from the everyday world of contract and tort- in which one might
expect a private actor - into another register, that of sovereignty and the
sovereign's immunity from suit.47 Two traditions intersect: one (derived
from popular sovereignty) that allows Americans to see themselves in the
bodies of fellow citizens, to see "America" when they see the contractors'
bodies, and another (the tradition of state sovereignty) by which the state
is itself a sovereign and immune from suit.
For two years Blackwater pushed these various claims unsuccessfully,
finally seeking review from the U.S. Supreme Court with the assistance
of Kenneth Starr.48 Blackwater finally derailed the case by invoking the
binding arbitration clause in the contract- in April 2007, a federal court
sent·the matter to arbitration, which takes place in private and does not
offer punitive damages.49 (The inclusion of binding arbitration clauses
in employment and independent contractor contracts is itself related to
the broader currents of privatization, with its valorization of nonpublic;
fora.5°)
45

See, for example, In re Grimely, 137 U.S. 47, 151-152 (1890) (describing enlistment contracts as
"special because they bring about a change in status, from civilian to soldier, just like marriage
contracts change a man's status to husband and the woman's status to wife"); see also Qualls
v. Rumsfeld, 357 F.Supp.2d 274 (D.D.C. 2005) (denying motion for preliminary injunction
by serviceman claiming that government's "stop-loss" policy which involuntarily extended his
service in Iraq was a breach of contract included provision for such extension).
46 Nordan v. Blackwater Security Consulting, LLC, 382 F.Supp.2d 801 (E.D.N.C. 2005).
47 Nordan, 382 F.Supp.2d at 807.
48 Cert, denied, Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC v. Nordan, 127 S. Ct. 1381 (2007). John M.
Broder and James Risen, "Blackwater Mounts a Defense with Top Talent," The New York
Times, Nov. 1, 2007.
49 Order, Apr. 20, 2007, Judge Fox, U.S. District Court, N.C. 2:o6-CV-49-F.
5 Clyde Summers, "Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights, Compelling the Unwilling
to Arbitrate," 6 University ofPennsylvania Journal of Labor and Employment (2004) "The effect
of the these contracts has been to privatize justice, substituting privately constructed arbitration
for publicly established courts."
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The Fallujah event also reached Congress when the Republican Party
lost its majority in the 2oo6 midterm elections and Congressman Waxman
began to hold hearings on the contractor industry, and Blackwater in
particular. In these hearings Prince, the head of Blackwater, emphatically
rejected the mercenary label. He referred to the contractors as "veterans"
(which many of them are) and to Blackwater as a place where they reenlist:
"Military contractors, comprised largely of military veterans 're-enlisting'
through the private sector like the four Americans killed in Fallujah, fill
vital gaps in the all-volunteer force."5' This marvelous locution - '"reenlisting' through the private sector" - captures well the novel space of
outsourced sacrifice as both private and sacrificial. Blackwater officials
also offered testimony from a State Department official: "We will always
remember their courage, commitment, and ultimate sacrifice for their
country."52
In our understanding of sacrifice as "outsourced" yet still sacrifice for
a national audience, we run into a fundamental question. Is sacrifice a
giving of the self, or can it can be the giving of a substitute?53 In many
of the classic stories of sacrifice, there is a substitution of the sacrificial
victim at the last minute (the ram in place of Isaac, a hind in place of
Iphigenia), although this (some commentators say) is transcended with
the self-sacrifice of Jesus or that of Socrates. The contractor case seems to
teeter on just this divide, between a giving of the self and the giving of the
substitute. In this emergent conception of outsourced sacrifice, does the
American public perceive the loss of the contractor as a giving of itself, as
seems to be the case with the soldier? If not, then we might think of the
contractor as more closely tied to the substitution version of sacrifice- more
the ram than Isaac. The significance of this, politically speaking, is that
the loss of the contractor will not serve as a check on officials' willingness
to have them die.
51 HBlackwater's Response to 'Majority Staff Report' on 'Private Military Contractors in Iraq: An

Examination of Blackwater's Actions in Fallujah."' Not dated or signed; released in Oct. 2007
at1o.
52 Statement of Andrew Howell, Esq., General Counsel, Blackwater USA for the Committee on

Oversight and Government Reform, Feb. 7, 2007 at 2 quoting Sean McCormick. Indeed, the
State Department had become increasingly close with and reliant on Blackwater since it hired
the company to provide for the security of much of its personnel around the world.
S3 2 Genesis 12-15; Maurice Bloch, Prey into Hunter: The Politics of Religious Experience. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 30.
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In a more recent scandal involving Blackwater, contractors shot and
killed 17 Iraqi civilians in Baghdad in 2007. As with the contractors' deaths,
the deaths of the civilians at first appeared to push against the legal structure that the United States (and the now sovereign Iraqi state) has designated for them as insignificant. In this case, the repressed category is
not sacrifice but homicide. Months after the Fallujah attacks and just
before leaving Iraq and transferring sovereignty from the Coalition Provisional Authority to Iraq, Paul Bremer issued Order 17, giving the contractors (Blackwater had been guarding Bremer) immunity from prosecution
under Iraqi law,54 implicitly designating those killed by the contractors as
"not murdered." Numerous legal reforms are currently proposed that seek
to increase accountability of the contractors and establish more adequate
structures of oversight and control. In late 2oo6, a defense spending bill,
with very little notice, placed contractors under military law, the Uniform
Code of Military Justice- but doubts have been raised about exercising
military jurisdiction over civilians. 55 Most recently, Iraq (through the 2008
Status of Forces Agreement with the U.S. and fueled by anger at the
killing of civilians in Baghdad by Blackwater) asserted jurisdiction over
contractors.56 And back in the U.S., in late 2008, several of the Blackwater workers involved in the Baghdad shooting have been indicted for
manslaughter.57 Overall, the contractors are increasingly subject to various forms of civil and military jurisdiction in the U.S. and Iraq but there
remains much uncertainty.
What policy discussions have not focused on is the other side of liability- the "sacrificial" liability of the U.S. government. There have been
5i Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 17 (Revised), Status of the Coalition

Provisional Authority, MNF-Iraq, Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq, at www.cpairaq.org/regulationsho04o627_CPAORD_17_Status_of_Coalition_Rev_with...Annex_A.pdf
(Section 4· 3 "Contractors shall be immune from Iraqi legal process with respect to acts
performed by them pursuant to the terms and conditions of a Contract or any sub-contract
thereton).
55 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. IOC)-364, S552, 120 Stat.
:1.083, :1.:1.17 (amending 10 U.S.C. S8o:~.(a)(10)).
56 Agreement Between The United States Of America and The Republic Of Iraq On The Withdrawal OfThe United States Forces From Iraq And The Organization OfThe Activities During Their Temporary Presence In Iraq, Art. 12(2), November 17, 2008, at www.whitehouse.gov/
infocus/iraq/SE_SOFApdf.
57 United States v. Slough et. al., Indictment, filed Dec. 4, :~.oo8, CR-o8-36o (D.C.D.C); see
Ginger Thompson and James Risen, 5 Guards Face U.S. Charges in Iraq Deaths, The New
York Times, December 6, 2008.
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no proposals to bury contractors at Arlington National Cemetery or to
insert them into the politically costly structures of honor and recognition
that played an important role in the rise of the industry in the first instance.
If contractors are to act on behalf of the sovereign - which, if they are to
kill and be killed in the interests of the United States, they are- perhaps
they should bear the marks of the sovereign as well. Of course, this could
generate other problems, because to designate an actors' suffering as a
sacrifice for the nation is to grant a particular form of prestige and power.

The Family and the Sovereign
The concept of sacrifice gives a particular kind of meaning to death, suffering, and violence, and it also seems to generate what we might think
of as sacrificial "energy."5 8 This sacrificial energy can be used to mobilize
patriotic sentiment, but it is not always easy to manipulate. I argued in
the last section that, in an attempt to avoid the potential misdirection of
that sacrificial energy against the state, the U.S. government uses private
military contractors to distance the sacrificial action from its potential association with the state. In that case, the attempt was not entirely successful,
and this section describes a few parallel ways in which the idea of sacrifice
is negotiated -ways in which U.S. officials try to privatize (and thereby
neutralize) sacrificial energy that they cannot control and nonstate actors
attempt to remobilize that energy. Whereas in the contractor case, the
United States uses the legal form of contract to privatize sacrifice, the
examples in this section show a different kind of privatization: here, we
can see an attempt to privatize sacrifice either by calling on gendered
understandings of sacrifice or by arguing that it is primarily in the private
sphere of the family that death has meaning. Much as in the contractor
case, however, the sacrifice theme cannot be so easily contained.
One reason that this sacrificial energy is so volatile is that several different
conceptions of sacrifice circulate simultaneously in U.S. public culture.
As a result, who sacrifices for whom is not always entirely clear, and the
ambiguity means that the idea of sacrifice can be deployed by people in
many different spheres. I will outline a few of these different conceptions
58 See Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss, Sacrifice: Its Nature and Function, trans. W. D. Halls,

Foreword by E. E. Evans-Pritchard. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, (1898]1981, 12.
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of sacrifice and, using the examples ofJessica Lynch and Cindy Sheehan,
discuss how these conceptualizations are manipulated both consciously
and unconsciously by actors who are trying to claim, or to avoid, the
various meanings that death and suffering can generate.
Two of the most frequently invoked constructions of sacrifice seem
entirely at odds with one another: on the one hand, we have an individualistic and egalitarian conception of sacrifice (in which sacrifice for one's
country can actually ground a claim to equal rights). On the other is a
gendered division of sacrificial labor in which the primary sacrificial role
is taken by men. This gende!ed conception in turn sets up a particular relationship of sacrifice and the family. I will discuss some of the permutations
of that relationship later.
Nancy Jay has elaborated on the gendered conception of sacrifice. She
describes sacrifice as a way in which men become the creators of life
and the social order. It frees men of the "consequences of being born a
woman ... and at the same time integrate[s] the pure and eternal patrilineage."59 Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, with its invocation of the "bringing
forth" and "conception" of the "nation" by "our fathers," the death of
soldiers so that the "nation might live," and the "new birth of freedom"
that their sacrifice allo~s, illustrates the point. 60 Through military sacrifice,
men give birth to themselves and to society; they become part of and create
the nation; they encompass the duality of male and female. The female
obverse of this conception, captured in the notion of republican motherhood, is that women sacrifice as mothers, giving their children to the
state. 61 The "family," associated with the female-gendered private realm,
thus has a shifting position with respect to sacrifice. If in some conceptions,
the family gives up its sons for the state; in others, the state goes to war to
protect the family- a parallel narrative to one in which men go to war to
protect women.
An individualistic conception of sacrifice, which draws on the revolutionary effects of the women's and civil rights movements of the 196os
59
60
61

Nancy Jay, Throughout Your Generations Forever: Sacrifice, Religion and Paternity. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1992, 40.
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Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Sovereignty, Identity, Sacrifice," in M. Ringrose and A. J. Lerner, eds.,
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and 197os, seems to have made some headway against the gendered conception. In this construction, sacrificial eligibility follows legal and social
notions of equality and individualism. Women and racial minorities.have
asserted equality claims to serve in the military, and service in the military
has grounded equality claims. As a citizen, each person can participate in
sacrificial dynamics, and those who participate in sacrifice have a claim to
equal citizenship. 62
If, however, we focus on the shared vulnerability entailed by the existence of nuclear weapons as a kind of conscription to a military conflict,
we see the matter differently. The post-WWII ~ra emerges as one in which
all Americans are grasped by the potential for sacrificial death, albeit a
passive sort. In the Cold War nuclear age, for example, each citizen was
told that he or she could be incinerated without a moment's notice. In
this more passive idea of sacrifice, of being sacrificed, the threat of nuclear
war represents the entire citizenry's availability for sacrifice. This is Paul
Kahn's conception of the matter:
Nuclear weapons are a constant reminder that the state's interests
come first and last, that all individuals - citizens and noncitizens
alike - may be sacrificed to the primacy of the sovereign state. These
weapons rest implicitly on a policy of conscription that extends to
every citizen - and even beyond - for which no exemptions are
granted. 63
In the current war on terror, we can see a similarly passive conception of
sacrifice: the conflict apparently does not require a full military and economic mobilization. Citizens learn to equate attacks on a small percentage
of their number as an attack on the United States.
The combination, then, of a developing notion of individual rights
and an imagined shared apocalypse, challenges a conception of society
as composed of distinct groups and offers a view in which each body can
instantiate the sovereign regardless of race, gender, or even nationality.
Differentiated conceptions of sacrifice have not disappeared, however;
within the military, soldiers can see themselves as sacrificing not for the
62
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International Law and Policy, 349, 355, 1999•

Sacrifice and Sovereignty

country but rather for their unit, their "band of brothers." We might also
think of an older conception of military sacrifice, as formulated by Samuel
Huntington, in which a "monastic" military sacrifices for a corrupt civilian
population; 64 or a more contemporary version, in which the hardworking
6
residents of the "heartland" sacrifice for blue-state elites. 5 While Senator
Obama, on the campaign trail in 2oo8, invoked death for the U.S. as a
powerful demonstration of unity: soldiers "have fought together and bled
together and some died together under the same proud flag. They have
not served a Red America or a Blue America- they have served the United
States of America." 66 In this section, the focus is on the shifting sacrificial
politics of gender and the family, but the range of conceptualizations is
worth referencing as tribute to its potential for meaningful manipulation
and mobilization.
The story of Jessica Lynch can be seen as a case in which the sacrifice concept was extensively manipulated. Originally a "heroic" story that
seemed to speak to a gender-neutral notion of military service and sacrifice,
it ultimately suggests that the gendered conception of sacrifice remains significant. A 19-year-old serving in Iraq in late March 2003, the ear1y days
of the U.S. invasion, Private Jessica Lynch was part of a supply convoy
that lost its way and came under ~ttack. She fought off her attackers, firing until she ran out of bullets and was injured, captured, and, according
6
to some accounts (but not Lynch's), raped. 7 A week later, a daring and
videotaped rescue mission brought her home. Lynch's story saturated the
news, appearing on the cover of national magazines as a "female Rambo"
and an "American hero."
Lynch's presence on the battlefield should have served to undercut the
gendered conception of sacrifice - how can men be sacrificing to protect
The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics
Harvard University Press, 1964,465-466. HuntMA:
Cambridge,
Relations.
of Civil-Military

64 See, for example, Samuel P. Huntington,

ington describes West Point as a Sparta in a the "midst of Babylon." He continues: ''Yet today
America can learn more from West Point than West Point from America .... If the civilians
permit the soldiers to adhere to the military standard, the nations themselves may eventually
find redemption and security in making that standard their own."
65 Robert D. Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground. New York: Random
House, 2005, 259-260.
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women if women are dying beside them? As though in answer to this
question, the Lynch story turned into one in which she was the victim,
rescued by men; it focused on her return to civilian life, in which she
hoped to become a nurturer, a kindergarten teacher. 68 Lynch was carefully
reinscribed as female in the traditional genre of womanhood in peril, the
captive narrative. 69 In addition, the facts behind the heroic version of
Lynch's story began to unravel: Lynch insisted that she hadn't fired a shot,
because her weapon was jammed; the Iraqi doctors, it turned out, had
been professional and caring, and the rescue itself actually encountered
little resistance. Lynch rejected the rendition of herself as a hero: "That
wasn't me. I'm not about to take credit for something I didn't do .... I'm
just a survivor." She complained to Diane Sawyer that the Pentagon "used
me to symbolize all this stuff."7°
Lynch's story simultaneously belies a generalized aversion to sacrifice
and demonstrates several ways in which the sacrifice narrative was first
gendered and ultimately undercut. Indeed, the U.S. relation to sacrifice
is not simply one of avoidance: sacrifice has been used rhetorically to
strengthen patriotic and nationalistic conceptions of the state. There are
also numerous ways in which U.S. officials attempt to contain, ignore,
avoid, or displace sacrificial energy, however. Thus, even while Lynch
was being proclaimed a hero at the center of a media frenzy, the eleven
U.S. soldiers who died in the same attack (one of whom was a mother)
were not mentioned. The silence around their deaths is reflected in many
other attempts to minimize the visibility of soldier sacrifice and -through
elisions of different conceptualizations of sacrifice - to displace sacrifice into the same "private" realm where Jessica Lynch's story ultimately
ended.
The ban on photos of returning caskets of U.S. soldiers arriving at
the Dover Air Force Base in Delaware is one such attempt and begins
to demonstrate how the relationship of sacrifice and family can be
manipulated. According to President Bush's spokesperson, the policy
(implemented in 1991 by then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney) served
to protect the "privacy" of the affected families, even though there are no
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Quoted in David Kirkpatrick,
"Jessica Lynch Criticizes Accounts of Her Ordeal,"

York Times, Nov. 7, 2003.
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identifying marks on the caskets.71 A Pentagon official explained that the
Dover base is "a tarmac, not a parade ground.''72 This is not the reception that we expect for the return of "heroic" soldiers, but in the context
of an increasingly unpopular war, the potential political danger posed by
these consecrated persons is palpable. The energy released by the dead,
in this context, is channelled by officials into "privacy," yet privacy seems
imposed, in a preemptive effort to forestall the sense that the families could
publicly utilize the energy released from sacrifice. Not only is the press
barred from the base, so too are the deceased soldiers' families, those whose
"privacy" is being protected.73
This is an intriguing privatization and one that reflects not only the
particularities of the war in Iraq but also (and more interestingly) turns to
the private sphere and the family to explain loss on behalf of the state. From
this view, the purpose of the political community is seen as the preservation
of private and family life- the private becomes the core public value, as
bemoaned by Hannah Arendt.74 This need not result in a liberal interest
group conception of the political sphere, however, because the family is
also a site full of sacrificial rhetoric that can be deployed to transcend the
private.
For officials, granting such prominent place to the private sphere and the
family carries its own risks, because there is no guarantee that families will
not make public use of their now exalted "private" position, as exhibited by
the families of those killed in the 9/11 attacks. Those families were able to
force an independent investigation into the attacks,75 even as the president
71 A settlement in a suit against the Pentagon brought under the Freedom ofinformation Act has
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succeeded in releasing some of the images, but the ban on the press remains. Ralph Begleiter,
who worked for the release of the images saw it as "significant victory for the honor of those
who have made the ultimate sacrifice in war for their country, as well as for their families,
for all service personnel and for the American people." John Files, "Pentagon Agrees to Issue
Photos of Coffins of Iraq War Dead," The New York Times, Aug. 5, 2005.
Lt. Col. Barry Venable, Defense Department Spokesman, quoted in Rebecca Carr, "Pentagon
Denies Mother's Plea for Photo," in Times Argus Mar. 24, 2005.
John Files, "Pentagon Agrees to Issue Photos of Coffins of Iraq War Dead," The New York
Times, Aug. 5, 2005. "The Pentagon issued a statement, saying, 'As with all information,
including images, the Department of Defense has an obligation and a responsibility to strike a
balance between our strong desire to be as transparent as possible and the legitimate concerns
to protect the privacy of military families and as necessary, operational security."'
See Hannah Arendt, "Public and Private," in The Human Condition. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1958.
See Jonathan Simon, "Parrhesiastic Accountability: Investigatory Commissions and Executive
Power in an Age of Terror," 114 Yale Law Journal, 1419 (2005).
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successfully channelled the energy and fear generated by the attacks in
the directions that he wished. To examine the potential implications of an
emphasis on the family and the private sphere, I conclude this section by
examining the widely publicized story of Cindy Sheehan, the 48-year-old
mother of U.S. Marine Casey Sheehan, who was killed in Iraq in April
2004, a few days after the contractors in Fallujah.
Cindy Sheehan staged a vigil outside President Bush's Texas ranch
during his summer holiday.76 She demanded that the president meet with
her So that she could question him about the war, which at that point had
claimed more than 1,8oo U.S. soldiers' lives (a number that, as usual, did
not include contractors or Iraqi civilians killed). Claiming the power of
sacrifice that she had made as a mother, she urged Bush to withdraw all
U.S. troops from Iraq. Sheehan had met with.the president during one of
the many closed-door sessions he held with the families of soldiers killed
in the war, but she took offense at his jovial attitude, his refusal to say her
son's name, and at the fact that he referred to her as "Mom."77 Her protest
rejected the president's description of grief as private or, more precisely,
mobilized her private suffering in the public domain.
Sheehan became both a focal point for antiwar demonstrators and a
target for some of the president's supporters who accused her of aiding the
enemy in the "global war."7 8 Sympathetic commentators dubbed Sheehan's outpost outside the president's ranch "Camp Casey," in. honor of the
dead son, but when she and her supporters placed small wooden crosses
on the roadside outside Bush's ranch -one for each U.S. soldier killedother parents of the deceased soldiers objected to the mobilization of their
children's deaths in the service of an antiwar protest. Competing concepts
of sacrifice were used either to support or reject her claim to protest. A
conservative commentator wrote that Sheehan's "loss of a son does not give
her particular standing with respect to analyzing the nature of this conflict
or the consequences of abandoning the fight."79
76

MacNeil Lehrer Newshour, Aug. 16, 2005, "Cindy Sheehan's Protest," transcript at
www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/july-decos/sheehan_8-!6.html.
77 Richard W. Stevenson, "Of the Many Deaths in Iraq, One Mother's Loss Becomes a Problem
for the President," The New York Times, Aug. 8, 2005.
78 Frank Gaffney, guest
on MacNeil Lehrer Newshour and columnist for the Washington
Times. Aug. 16, 2005, "Cindy Sheehan's Protest," at www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/julydecos/sheehan_8-!6 .html.
79
Frank Gaffney, "Poster Child for Surrender," Washington Times, Aug. 16, 2005. Frank Rich,
"The Swift Boating of Cindy Sheehan," The New York Times, Aug. 21, 2005, summarized: "True
to form, the attack on Cindy Sheehan surfaced early on Fox News, where she was immediately
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Indeed, the various ideas of sacrifice can easily become blurred: Was
Sheehan mobilizing her son's sacrifice, or was she speaking of her own
sacrifice as a mother? Was hers a private or a public loss? Was it an
individual or a collective loss? Some claimed that her effort to bring her loss
into the public, to nationalize and publicize it, was a means of exploiting
her private position. Others wrote that she was either a dupe oflarger forces
opposing the President, or disqualified as an innocent victim because her
political activism against the war made her a partisan.
As Sheehan's protest gained momentum and support- including paid
television advertisements in Texas and a national tour- the White House
countered with its own war mother, Tammy Pruett, whose husband and
four sons had served (but not died) in Iraq. President Bush praised the family in a public address: "America lives in freedom because of families like
the Pruetts."80 Sheehan's supporters pointed out, and Ms. Pruett conceded
that, as Pruett had not lost anyone in the war, she should not be compared
with those who had. 81 One parent declared that Sheehan "better not be
presenting herself as the voice of all the fallen.'' 82 A tour under the banner
of "You Don't Speak for US, Cindy" began in Sheehan's hometown and
made its way to Bush's ranch. On the other side of the debate, candles
were lit across the United States in more than 1,6oo antiwar protests. 83
The father of a soldier killed in Iraq objected: "The lady's not honoring
her son's sacrifice, because we don't have a draft, and he went and signed
his name on the dotted line."84 In other words, because Sheehan's son's
action was voluntary and was a sacrifice that he himself had authored, her
complaint was really with him.
Again, several ideas about sacrifice are simultaneously present, and different formulations lead to drastically different conclusions about official
and individual responsibility. If Sheehan thought that her son's death was

80

81

82
83

Bi

labeled a 'crackpot' by Fred Barnes. The right-wing blogosphere quickly spread tales of her
divorce, her angry Republican in-laws, her supposed political flip-flops, her incendiary sloganeering and her association with known ticket-stub-carrying attendees of 'Fahrenheit 9/u.'
Rush Limbaugh declared that Ms. Sheehan's "story is nothing more than forged documentsthere's nothing about it that's real."
Elizabeth Bumiller, "In the Struggle over the Iraq War, Women Are on the Front Line," The
New York Times, Aug. 29,2005.
Id.
Abby Goodnough, "In War Debate, Parents of Fallen Are United Only In Grief," The New
York Times, Aug. 27,2005.
Paul Harris, "Mother Tips Balance against Bush," Aug. 21, 2005, The Observer.
Id.
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a waste, then perhaps officials are responsible for his death having been a
meaningless death - rather than a sacrifice, the death starts to look more
like a homicide. Her claim that it was a meaningless death also raises questions about the purported purpose of the war. As another mother of a dead
soldier said, "I read that she questioned whether her son died for a noble
cause, and I totally disagree with her on that. ... Her son died for the most
noble cause: human rights." 85 In this formulation, official responsibility
is intermingled with a more "universal" cause. Casey Sheehan did not
sacrifice for the American popular sovereign so much as for human rights
or, instead, the two are intermingled. Contemporary advertisements for
the army portray the delivery of freedom to the oppressed and sustenance
to the needy. Indeed, this version of U.S. military action as oriented less
to the destruction of an enemy than the expansion of universal rights is
increasingly visible. 86 It speaks to a transcendent imperial project in which
the U.S. is willing to sacrifice to save others and to provide the basic public
good of global security. In its strongest form, which perfectly inverts narratives of the U.S. as an exploitative empire, the globe is seen as covered in
the blood of Americans who have died for others. As former presidential
candidate John McCain urged: "But the fact is, America is the greatest
force for good in the history of the world. My friends, we have gone to all
four corners of the Earth and shed American blood in defense, usually,
of somebody else's freedom and our own." 87 In the same vein, President
Bush, when asked on 6o Minutes whether he owed an apology to the
people of Iraq, responded that, on the contrary, "the Iraqi people owe the
American people a huge debt of gratitide" and most Iraqis "understand
that we've endured a great sacrifice to help them."88
What unites the examples of the contractors and Sheehan is that it
is nonstate actors who are advocating for greater recognition of sacrifice
and consecration, while officials seem unnerved by the unpredictability
and political danger inherent in doing so. This posture of officials is,
85 Id.
86 Although, as Ann Stoler remarks, it would be a mistake to see American empire as unique in

imagining itself as beneficent and committed to universal values. Ann Laura Stoler, "Degrees
oflmperial Sovereignty," 18, 1: Public Culture, 125-146, 133 (2oo6).
87 Transcript of Second McCain-Obama Debate, at www.cnn.comhoo8/POLITICS1lo/o7/
•
presidential.debate.transcript.
88 Transcript of President Bush in an interview with Scott Pelley on 6o Minutes, January 14,2007,
at www.cbsnews.com/storieshoo7/o1/l4f6ominutes/maim359119_page2.shtml.
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presumably, grounded in the specifics of the Iraq conflict and in the
particular examples that I have selected. Even so, some more general
patterns. can be discerned. Calling a death a sacrifice can be a sort of
accountability, because the designation means that a death was for some
higher purpose, which is a claim that can then be tested. If the death seems
to meet that test, then the "sacrifice" label can serve to protect officials from
the anger directed at them. If it fails, then the term sacrifice sets out the
basis of a complaint- that what should have been meaningful was not.

Sacrifice and the Detainee
"They have no regard for human life." 89
-U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Harry Harris in response to
detainee suicides at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
[t]ake some of my blood ... take pieces of my death shrouds ... take some of
my remains ... take pictures of my dead body when I am placed in my grave,
lonely...
-Suicide letter of Jumah al-Dossari, Guanhinamo Bay detainee

Sacrifice, as I have discussed it so far, has been tied to a "giving of the
self"- either a person gives of him- or herself for the sake of the community
or a community gives of itself for the sake of its members. This emphasis
on the self and the community makes sense, given that I am discussing
sacrifice in the context of citizenship in a regime grounded in popular
sovereignty. In this section, however, I want to ask a different- if related question: Can the suffering of those considered to be "enemies," the
detainee~ held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, be seen as sacrificial?
Suicide in custodial settings has often had a sacrificial dimension.
The deaths of hunger-striking members of the Irish Republican Army
in the 198os are well-known examples of suicides that were construed
as sacrificial.9° Prisoners described their self-imposed death as a gift to
89 "Guantanamo Inmates Commit Suicide," June u, :z.oo6,

Aljazeera.net News Global, at

www.english.aljazeera.net/englishffemplates/Genera!Article.aspx.
90 Unlike the United States, the United
Kingdom has recognized the mentally competent prisoners' right to refuse medical care. Sec'y of State v. Robb, [1995] Fam. 12.7. See Alan Feldman,

Fonnations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, 2.47· In the United States, while there is a right
to refuse unwanted medical treatment, there is no right to assisted suicide. Washington v.
Glucksberg, 52.1 U.S. 702., 72.8 (1997). The fact of custody renders detainee conduct "assisted,"
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larger cause. In such cases, death becomes a path to transcendence. At
Guantanamo, however, where suicides, attempted suicides, and hunger
strikes have been an ongoing part of daily life in recent years, the sacrificial component is much less clear. We have little information about how
detainees frame their conduct, and the United States has sought whenever
possible to prevent detainee suicide.
In a sense, the sacrificial dimension here is present in its negation, a
denial of sacrifice that we see both in Giorgio Agamben's explicit equation
of Guantanamo detainees with homo sacer, he who cannot be sacrificed,
and in U.S. officials' emphasis on "preserving life" (or preventing potentially meaningful deaths).9' I want to explore here the different meanings
given to the detainees' suffering, using the sacrifice theme more loosely as
a way to open up questions about the communicative potential of death.
By way of background, it should be noted that the U.S. posture at
the detention center has evolved over time. Sometimes Guantanamo is
described in easily comprehensible terms - as a site for intelligence gathering, removing combatants from the :field of battle, or holding trials. 92
Although it is a highly secretive location about which the public is told
very little, Guantanamo has also served as a theatre in which the United
States performs its domination over its enemies, a feature of the camp
that was most obvious in the initial images released by the Pentagon, of
stooped and hooded detainees.93 Some formulations present the prison as
a site of beneficence, where detainees are treated more hu~anely than
they deserve; othe~s see it as a pl11ce of justice, where they are subjected to

91

92

93

turning the state's act of omission into one of commission. The detainee's interest in privacy
is less than that the state's interest in "preserving life." One court wrote regarding a hungerstriking prisoner: "We cannot condemn fasting - Gandhi taught us about its force - as a way
to secure change. But prison officials must do their best to preserve [the prisoner's) Life."
White v. Narick, 170 W.Va. 195, 292 S.E.2d 54 (W.Va. 1982) (convicted murderer serving a
life sentence protesting prison conditions). For a discussion of U.S. case-law of force-feeding
of hunger strikers in custodial settings, see Mara Silver, Testing Cruzan: Prisoners and the
Constitutional Question of Self-Starvation, 58 Stanford Law Review, 631 (2005).
Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kenin Attell. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2005, 3-+
These are the elements that Joseph Margulies, who represented many of the Guantanamo
detainees, offers to describe what the prison was "originally intended" to provide. Joseph
Margulies, Guantanamo and the Abuse of Presidential Power. New York: Simon & Schuster,
2006,+
See Stephen Holmes, The Matador's Cape: America's Reckless Response to Terror. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007,280. Holmes interprets one appeal oftorture to its defenders
as stemming from the fact that it flouts all restrictions.

Sacrifice and Sovereignty
the harsh treatment and interrogation that they deserve. Finally, the fact
that the camp is seen as an exception from U.S. civilian and military law is
a debated but important facet- although the Bush administration would
insist in any formal legal proceeding that it was acting legally, tacitly and
rhetorically transgressing "law" in its public statements was an important
way of signalling commitment to (American) "life."94
It is possible to plot two parallel and sometimes intersecting challenges
to the unchecked executive control initially asserted at Guanhinamo: the
legal struggle to bring the detainees' case before the Supreme Court, and
the detainees' bodily struggle through the use of suicide and hunger strikes.
Although Guantanamo was beset with protests from at least 2003, the most
detailed information available concerns two hunger strikes in 2005.
Attorneys for the detainees reported that between 100 and 200 detainees
had undertaken a hunger strike in July 2005;95 it was called off when
camp officials agreed to improve conditions and accelerate access to legal
procedures. In the statements of detainees and their advocates (drawn
principally from litigation discussed at greater length later), this hunger
strike serves as a founding moment for the political society of the camp. In
a variation of Hobbes' parable adapted to the custodial setting, everyman
lowered his sword from his own neck. A report on the hunger strikes
94 The rejection by top Bush and Cheney advisors of "acting extralegally" is the perhaps most

interesting part of Jack Goldsmith's account of his brief tenure as head of the Office of Legal
Counsel. Advisors such as Alberto Gonzales and David Addington, according to Goldsmith,
rejected what Goldsmith calls the "Locke-Jefferson" paradigm: where the executive would
take legally questionable steps (in Locke's language, exercise prerogative) when absolutely
necessary but would then "throw himself on the mercy of Congress and the people so that
they could decide whether the emergency was severe enough to warrant extralegal action." By
contrast, because of the "hyper-legalization of warfare," according to Goldsmith, this model
was "off the table." "The President had to do what he had to do to protect the country. And
the lawyers had to find some way to make what he did legal." Jack Goldsmith, The Terror
Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Administration. New York: Norton, 2007, 83,
81. It is hoped that the term sacrifice is not stretched too much to think that it is relevant
here: that the official who knowingly makes him- or herself a criminal for the common good
sacrifices him- or herself for it. Slhe hopes that the sacrifice will be necessary, that they will
be forgiven. This seems to be the civil disobedience model of prerogative power that Judge
Posner has described. Richard Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of
National Emergency. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, 152-155. It is a favorite motif
of the television series 24 that government agent Jack Bauer invariably has to break the law
to defuse the latest terrorist plot but then offers himself up for judgment once the crisis has
passed. By comparison, Goldsmith's account puts the rejection of this offering of the self for
judgment at the heart of what was asked of the Office of Legal Counsel.
95 Charlie Savage, "46 Guantanamo Detainees Join Hunger Strike," The Boston Globe, Dec. 30,

2005.
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at Guantanamo by the Center for Constitutional Rights summarizes the
quasi-contractual nature of this founding moment:
The breadth and severity of the June/]uly 2005 Hunger Strike forced
the DoD [Department of Defense Jto permit the creation of prisoners'
representative committee and to negotiate with prison officials concerning the protestors' demands. Based upon U.S. promises to bring
the detention center into compliance with the Geneva Conventions,
the June/]uly 2005 Hunger Strike ended on July 28, 2005.96
The detainees, acting in concert, gained a form of government and won
"promises" that the officials would follow international law.
It was a short-lived peace, however: on August 8, 2005, another mass
hunger strike was initiated and continued throughout the year. 97 Detainee
Yousef al-Shehri explained to his attorneys that
[A]fter the first strike, they gave us promises. They said we will respect
you and your religion and we will give you your rights. They promised
me I would be freed. They promised many detainees they would be
released. We waited but they did not deliver. Instead they disrespected
us and our religion, they threw the Koran on the floor and stripped
us naked.98
The agreement between detainees and jailors had not included the interrogators, who, according to detainee Al-Azmi, proved its undoing because
they were "opposed improving the conditions at Guantanamo .... "99
When the detainees began a second hunger strike, however, the DoD
was ready for them, having ordered twenty-five "Emergency Restraint
Chairs" - the advertisement for which described them as "Like a Padded
Cell 'on Wheels"'- from an Iowa company. 100 A detainee from Yemen,
Emad Hassan, described the chairs:
96 Center

for Constitutional Rights, "The Guantanamo Prisoner Hunger Strikes and Protest:
February 2002-August zoos,'' Sept. 8, 2005, p. 12.
97 Charlie Savage, "46 Guantanamo Detainees
Join Hunger Strike,'' The Boston Globe, Dec. 30,
200598Statement made Oct. 12005 in Supplemental Declaration by Julia Tarver, Esq., filed Oct. 13,
2005, Al-Joudi et. al. v. Bush, Civ. 05--0301 at 6-7.
99 Quoted in Declaration of Thomas B.
Wilner, filed Oct. 14, 2005, AI Odah v. United States,
Civ. 02--0828.
100 Tim Golden, "Tough U.S. Steps in Hunger Strike at Camp
in Cuba," The New York Times,
Feb. 9, 2006.
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The head is immobilized by a strap so it can't be moved, their hands
are cuffed to the chair and the legs are shackled ... They ask, 'are you
going to eat or not?' and if not, they insert the tube. People have been
vrinating and defecating on themselves in the feedings and vomiting
and bleeding. 101
Medical organizations and the United Nations criticized the policy of
force-feeding, but U.S. officials were prepared to exploit the potential
irony of the situation. When the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
concluded that "some of the methods used for force feeding definitely
amounted to torture," 102 the United States responded that "it is bewildering to the United States Governmen t that its practice of preserving
the life and health of detainees is roundly condemned by the Special
Rapporteurs and is presented as a violation of their human rights and of
10
medical ethics." 103 Faced with criticism from the medical community, 4 a
Pentagon spokesman responded that, "the policy of the department ... is
to support the preservation of life by appropriate clinical means and to do
that in a humane manner." 10 5 In response to the medics' observation that
the World Medical Association prohibits force-feeding of prisoners, the
Pentagon replied that "Professional organization declarations by doctors,
lawyers, dentists, etc., are not international treaties, and therefore are not
106
bin~ing and not applicable to sovereign nation-states."
Attorneys, concerned about their clients' well-being, petitioned a federal judge to allow access to their clients' medical files and notice of
10
when their clients were to be force-fed. 7 The government contended that
its policies- force-feeding in particular- ensured that "no detainee's life

101 Quoted in Eric Schmitt and Tim Golden, "Force-Feeding At Guantanamo Is Now Acknowl-

edged," The New York Times, Feb. 22, 2oo6.

102 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, "Situation of

Detainees at Guantanamo Bay," Feb. 15, 2oo6.
31, 2006 addressed to Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights from
Kevin Edward Moley, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations and Other International Organizations in Geneva, cited in id.,
Annex II.
104 In a letter signed by over 250 doctors and published in the British medical journal The Lancet.
"Forcefeeding and Restraint of Guantanamo Bay Hunger Strikers," (2oo6) 367: 8u.
105 Will Dunhan, "US Defends Guantanamo Force-feeding," Reuters News Agency, Mar. 10, 2006.

103 Letter Jan.

1o6rd.
107 Al-Joudi

v. Bush, 406 F.Supp.2d 13 (D.D.C. 2005) (J. Kessler).
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or health will be endangered" and thus there is no chance of irreparable
injury from the hunger strike, noting that "no one has died."108 The attorneys did not raise their clients' right to deny medical treatment, what we
might construe as a right to sacrifice; rather, they expressed concern about
their clients' condition. Al-Shehri's lawyer, for example, noted that "his
psychological and mental condition is commensurate with his rapidly failing health,''109 and another attorney wrote of Mr. Al-Azmi that he "looked
like the pictures one sees of starving people in the Sudan."110 In addition,
some of the attorneys positioned themselves as opposed to the hunger
strike, as advocates for life over what they apparently saw only as selfdestruction:
[w]e tried to encourage him to end his hunger strike, telling him
that we believed that there had been positive developments before
the courts and that we hoped he would be granted a hearing soon.
Mr. Daihani told us that he had no faith in the U.S. courts. We had
brought him a pizza from the local Subway on the base, which he
refused to eat. ... He said the only control he has at Guantanamo is
over what he eats, and that he will not eat again until he is released
or charged and tried so that he can defend himself and prove his
innocence.m
In its October 2005 decision, the court accepted the attorneys' rendition
of the detainees' vulnerability and found that although the detainees did
"not lack legal competence as children do, they are indeed vulnerable
to further physical deterioration, and possibly death, by virtue of their
custodial status at Guantanamo and weakened physical condition."112 A
preliminary injunction is typically entered to stop one party from harming
another; in this instance, the simple-minded reading would be that the
detainees requested an injunction against their own behavior. But because
108 Transcript of
hearing at 43
109 Supplemental

cited in Al-Joudi v. Bush, 406 F.Supp.2d 13, 20 (D.D.C. 2005).
Declaration by Julia Tarver, Esq., filed Oct. 13, 2005, AI-Joudi et al., v. Bush,
Civ. 05-0301 at 6.
110 Declaration of Thomas
B. Wilner, filed Oct.14, 2005, AI Odah v. United States, Civ. 02-o828,
at 10.
111
Id., at 3·
11 2Al-Joudi, 406 F.Supp.2d at 20.
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the detainees were in custody, their actions could not be attributed to them
in any simple way:
[T]he Court is cognizant of the fact that Petitioners have voluntarily
decided to participate in the hunger strike. Petitioners claim, however, that their voluntary participation is, in fact, a· desperate protest
against what they perceive as a long, potentially indefinite, confinement without final adjudication of their status. The legal analysis of
irreparable harm must focus not on the cause of the injury, but rather
the degree and imminence of the harm that will result if the court
does not issue emergency relief. 11 3
The court solved the puzzle of the self-inflicted injury by disaggregating
the injury from its cause. Of note, other federal courts faced with the
same claim have refused to do this and rather have seen the harm as selfinflicted and hence as not warranting a preliminary injunction. 114 This
disagreement seems quite fundamental: \Vho really is the cause of the
hunger strike?
The court ordered that the detainees' attorneys be given 24-hour notice
of force-feeding of their clients and that for those who were force-fed,
their medical records be provided to their attorneys. This would allow the
attorneys to "counsel [the detainees] in order to persuade them to stay
alive," an obvious requirement if they are "to present their claims to the
ll>Jd.
114 See AI Odah v. U.S.
406 F.Supp.2d 37,44 (D.D.C. 2005). "The Court cannot agree that any

risk of death that Petitioner faces is solely 'due to the government's improper and substandard
force-feeding treatment.' Petitioner has eliminated an important causal link in his analysis the fact that Petitioner himself is participating in a hunger strike. Without passing judgment
on the motives behind Petitioner's participation in the hunger strike, the Court finds that
Petitioner, causally, is first and foremost at risk of death of his own accord. Thus the proper
question for the Court to consider in determining whether or not to grant Petitioner's request
for an injunction forcing Respondents to provide medical reports and access to medical records
is whether failure to access such documents will cause irreparable injury above and beyond
the state that Petitioner is already in .... [T]he Court concludes that on this record, irreparable
injury in this case is caused not by Respondents' treatment of Petitioner but by Petitioner's own
actions.» See also El-Banna v. Bush, 394 F.Supp.2d 76, 78 (D.D.C. 2005), which presented
another issue: the detainees claimed that they were imminent danger because "Guantanamo
Bay medical personnel stated that if a hunger-striking detainee provided written authorization,
medical personnel would refrain from using heroic means to preserve the striking detainees'
health and, ultimately, life.» When officials assured the court that this was not the case, that
they would provide involuntary care, the court determined that there was no imminent danger
that warranted a preliminary injunction.
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Court ... "ns The court situated its preliminary injunction as deriving from
the "privilege of litigation" that the Supreme Court had extended to the
Guantanamo detainees in Rasul v. Bush. 116
The court did not confront the issue (which the attorneys had not
raised) of whether the detainees had a right to take their own lives. 117
Thus, this decision from a federal trial court, although a small and a
relatively insignificant episode in the struggle at Guantanamo, indicates
that opposition to detainee suicide is the default position. The military
rhetoric focused on the "preservation of life," and neither the court nor
the detainee advocates consider an affirmative case for the detainees' right
to commit suicide. What then constitutes the difference in the positions
of the military, the advocates, and the court? I want to suggest that the
difference lies partly in the fact that the military is keenly aware of the
possibility that detainee deaths might be construed as deeply meaningful,
whereas the detainees' attorneys emphasized the detainees' helplessness.
Following the logic presented by the military officials, we might see the
hunger strike as a form of powerful action retained by detainees until
officials instituted force-feeding. While he or she has some control ~ver his
or her own body, the detainee retains some small domain of what Georges
Bataille understands as sovereignty, as "life beyond u'tility," life opposed
to servility, or the ability to destroy a surplus. Harming oneself, then, is a
means of claiming sovereignty in this sense because it asserts that one has
something to destroy (or to "give," in sacrificial terms). 118
In June zoo6, three detainees succeeded in committing suicide, hanging
themselves with bedsheets/'9 notwithstanding the fact that since February
officials had been reading to detainees passages from the Koran forbidding
suicide. 120 The detainees left suicide notes, but officials have refused to
115 Al-Joudi at 22.
!1 6 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
117 One reason for this is that the right to petition for habeas corpus, which underlay the attorney's

claims, concerns access to the courts and challenges to the fact of detention, not its conditions.
The Accursed Share: An Essay on General Economy, trans. Robert Hurley.
New York: Zone Books, Vol. 3, '97· Bataille explains that "[t]he sovereignty I speak of has little
to do with the sovereignty of States, as international law defines it. I speak in general of an
aspect that is opposed to the servile and the subordinate."
ll 9 See Mark Denbeaux and Joshua W. Denbeaux, "June 10th Suicides at Guantanamo:
Government Words and Deeds Compared," August 21, 2oo6 at www.law.shu.edu/news/
guantanamo_report_june_suicides_8_21_o6.pdf.
120 David S. Cloud and Neil A. Lewis, "Prisoners' Ruse Is Inquiry Focus at Guantanamo," The
New York Times, June 12., 2006. Sgt. Sara Wood, "Three Guantanamo Bay Detainees Die of

ll 8 Georges Bataille,
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release them. One reaction to the suicides saw them as cover-ups for
murder. The father of one detainee expressed skepticism that his son had
killed himself, 121 and a Saudi state-sponsored human rights group wrote
that the lack of oversight at the camp made it "easy to pin the crime on the
prisoners .... "122 Former detainees who knew the deceased also scorned
the claim that the deaths were suicides and speculated that it was more
likely that the guards killed them during one of the regular and violent cell
extractions. 123 The released detainees drew a firm line between hunger
strikes and suicide and did not entertain the notion that suicide could
have been an honorable act. It was "offensive" "to suggest that [one of the
deceased] would stoop to the level of taking his own life." 124 Advocates for
the detainees in the United States, in contrast to military officials, saw the
fault as laying with the United States for having "pushed" the detainees
"on the road to death" by creating "despair." 125
The military articulated two points: its own love oflife and the aggressive
nature of the suicides. One DoD official framed the United States' interest:
"we are always concerned when someone takes his own life, because as
Americans we value life even if it is the life of the violent terrorist captured
waging war against our country."126 Military officials also described the
suicides as acts of war against the United States. U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Harry Harris said that the detainees "have no regard for human life."
He continued, "Neither ours nor their own. I believe this was not an
act of desperation but an act of asymmetric warfare waged against us." 127
Apparent Suicide," American Forces Press Service, U.S. Department of Defense, J~ne 10, 2oo6,
at www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=l6o8o.
121 "Family Disputes Guantanamo Suicide" June 14, 2oo6, Aljazeera.net
News Global, accessed
July 7, 2oo6 at http://english.aljazeera.net/englishffemplates/GeneralArticle.aspx.
122 Mufleh al-Qahtani, Deputy
Director, Saudi Human Rights group, quoted in "Guantanamo Inmates Commit Suicide," June u, 2006, Aljazeera.net News Global, at www.
english.aljazeera.netlenglishffemplates/Genera!Article.aspx.
123 Statement by Tarek Dergoul and Statement of June 13, 2oo6 by
British citizens formerly held
at Guantanamo Bay, www.libertysecurity.org/article994·html and at www.cageprisoners.com.
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125 Barbara Olshansky of the
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Commit Suicide," June u, 2oo6, Aljazeera.net News Global, at www.english.aljazeera.net/
englishffemplates/Genera!Article.aspx.
126 Cully Stimson, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
quoted in "Dead Detainee
Was to Be Freed," June 12, 2oo6, BBC News, accessed June 21, 2oo6 at http://news.
bbc.co.ukh/hi/americas/so70514.stm.
127 Rear Adm. Harry Harris quoted in "Guantanamo Suicides 'not
PR move,'" BBC News, June
12, 2oo6, at www.newsvote.bbbc.co.uk.
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Harris also referenced what he called the "mystical" belief among detainees
that three of their number had to die for the rest to go free. 128 Suicide, understood as intended to shame the United States internationally, undermine its morale, and attack its commitment to "life," is seen a
manipulative technique, which thus positions force-feeding as a responsive tactic. The sacrifice theme is present here in its "evil" iteration in references to the extremism of those who are willing to martyr themselves to harm America. The use of the term asymmetric suggests that the
United States does not engage in such practices, but the very fact that, of
all the interpreters of the suicides (including detainees), the U.S. officials
come closest to seeing the detainees' act as a sacrifice - as lives offered
to further a meaningful cause - suggests that they are highly attuned to
sacrificial dynamics. The United States' "commitment to life," then, is
perhaps more accurately framed as a demand that the state monopolize
death. In this case, the suicide of the detainee harms the United States not
only in public and international opinion but also in its ability to command
sacrifice.
The officials attempt to neutralize the meaningful potential of suicide
by naming the act as aggressive, as though by this designation they can
combat the effectiveness of the technique. Indeed, the DoD has elaborated
an entire vocabulary that emphasizes the communicative and manipulative nature of detainee conduct. No longer content with the broad brush
of "suicide attempt," since 2003 officials speak of "hanging gestures" and
"manipulative self-injurious behavior" to describe a variety of acts, including some suicide attempts. 129 Only those acts in which officials discerned
a sincere intention to commit suicide are designated suicide attempts. 13°
128 James Risen and Tim Golden, "3 Prisoners Commit Suicide at Guantanamo,"

The New York
Times, June n, 2oo6. Tim Golden writes that Col. Mike Bumgarner, warden of Guanhinamo

Bay at the time of the hunger strike, told him that a Saudi detainee, Shaker Aamer, told Baumgarner that"several of the detainees had had a 'vision,' in which three of them had to die for the
rest to be freed." Tim Golden, "The Battle for Guanhinamo," The New York Times Magazine,
Sept. 17, 2oo6.
129 Associated Press, "23 Detainees Attempted Suicide in Protest at Base, Military Says," The New
York Times, Jan. 25, 2005.
130 Mark Denbeaux and Joshua W. Denbeaux, "Report on the Guantanamo Detainees during
Detention: Data from Department of Defense Records," Seton Hall Public Law Research
Paper No. 916789, July 10, 2oo6, at SSRN: www.ssrn.com/abstract=916789, p. 14 ("According
to Capt. Edmondson, this category includes acts of self-harm in which 'the individual's state of
mind is such that they did not sincerely want to end their own life,' but instead was intended
to obtain release or better treatment").
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Although it is the U.S. officials who seem most attuned to sacrificial possibilities, they are also the ones most determined to impede and disguise
them.
Agamben has compared the detainees in the U.S. war'on terror to the
victims of the Nazi concentration camps. 131 Those in the camps were,
like homo sacer, people who could be killed but not sacrificed. He chides
Georges Bataille for emphasizing the "prestige" that can be generated
through sacrifice, claiming that he "immediately exchanges the political
body of the sacred man, which can be killed but not sacrificed and which
is inscribed in the logic of exception, for the prestige of the sacrificial
body, which is defined instead in the logic of transgression." 132 Agamben's
comparison to the Nazis seems legalistic and formalistic in that it does
not address obvious substantive differences. My case study highlights one
other issue: the nature of the U.S. interest in the body of the detainee.
The U.S. response to hunger strikes suggests that there is indeed for the
United States a "prestige of the sacrificial body," a potential that must be
blocked and prevented. WhatAgamben describes, then, is whatthe United
States attempts to enact: a situation in which the detainee is excluded from
sacrifice. An enormous effort seems directed toward this exclusion, even
when there is little evidence that the detainees or other audiences see
their conduct in such terms. One of the interesting things about this case
is that none of the actors is able to claim the significance of the deaths
authoritatively, in a manner that silences the others. If I speak of sacrifice,
it is largely because of the energy expended in denying that meaning.
Ultimately, however, is it appropriate to talk about sacrifice in this
situation? On the one hand, the detainees' custodial status raises questions
abouttheir relationship to the United States (are they a part of the sovereign
or not). On the other, it is unclear whether the form of communication
that they are engaged in is truly accessing a form of sacred or transcendent
131 Agamben, State of Exception,

trans. Ken in Attell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Agamben writes of President Bush's November 13, 2001 military order authorizing the indefinite
detention of noncitizens suspected of terrorist involvement: "Neither prisoners nor persons
accused, but simply 'detainees,' they are the object of pure de facto rule ... since it is entirely
removed from the law and from judicial oversight.'' He then engages in what seems to be
excessive formalism: "The only thing to which it could possibly be compared is the legal
situation of the Jews in the Nazi Lager [camps], who, along with their citizenship, had lost
every legal identity, but at least retained their identity as Jews" (3-4; italics and parenthesis in
original).
132 Agamben, Homo
Sacer, at 113.
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meaning or whether it is a more exchange-oriented sense of the word; that
is, are the detainees "giving" themselves to the United States? Actually,
the question of "giving" is a conundrum of sacrifice noted in many of the
religious examples: how can one give to an entity that already owns the
thing given? (If all of creation belongs to God, how can we give to that
entity what God already possesses? The United States certainly seems to
take the position that the life of the detainee belongs to it.) What is critical
to the detainee transaction is the dual assertion of taking and giving in the
same act of destruction. Destruction claims ownership at the same time as
it alienates that claim. This combination links and separates the parties,
the detainees, their captors, and the courts.
This understanding of the place of destruction in sacrifice as derivative from the fact that the giver does not really "own" the thing given
suggests one reason why in everyday speech in a liberal society we can
"sacrifice" something by alienating our interest in it but need not destroy
it. Liberal theory supposes the self-owning person and thereby avoids the
confusion of ownership that the religious (and sovereign) examples of sacrifice address. 133 If humans, not God (or the sovereign state), are the owners
of creation, sacrifice need not involve the two-step process of destruction
and then alienation.
The detainee makes no claim that asserts membership in the popular
sovereign, yet a part of the United States is offered up to itself: if, as the
officials say, the United States is committed above all to "life," then the
detainee is able to access this core value for which this sovereign says that
it stands. Indeed, the detainee implicitly recognizes this claim to his or her
life by the United States; the action presumes that the state has an interest
in his or her life. Of course, this "life" that the United States stands for

133 Even

classic liberal texts resist an absolute commitment to self-ownership. See, for example,
John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government. New York: Macmillan, (169o]1952., Ch. II,
6 ("for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the
servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his business;
they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another's
pleasure: and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there
cannot be supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy one
another, as if we were made for one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for
ours. Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully ... ";
emphasis added).
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refers to a variety of things: human life in general, American lives, or the
life of the state itself over and above any particular human lives.
After the successful suicides and the resulting media interest, officials
expressed their new countersacrificial posture, as I would deem it, in architectural form. Plans to provide less restrictive housing for the remaining
detainees were replaced with a supermaximum security facility - the
building-sized version of the restraint chairs used for hunger strikers. Moreover, in June 2006 the government imported a new group of fourteen "highvalue" detainees to Guanhinamo, at least one of whom has more obligingly
played the role the government has seemed to assume all along. 134 When
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, recognized by many as the planner of the 9/11
attacks, recently demanded of his Guanhinamo tribunal that he be put to
death since "I'm looking to be martyr for long time,'' 135 the officials might
have sensed that they were finally dealing with someone who spoke their
language.
A final glimpse into the context of the hunger strikes, suicide attempts,
and other forms of protest by detainees can be found in an October 2005
letter by one detainee, Jumah al:Dossari, to his New York attorney and
translator, explaining his suicide. 136 In the letter, a two-page document
declassified by the Pentagon, which I first encountered on the Center
for Constitutional Rights Web site, Dossari apologizes to his attorney and
interpreter for performing his suicide in their presence: "I feel very sorry
for forcing you to see ... It might be the first time in your life ... to see a
human being who suffered too much ... dying in front of your eyes ... I
know it is an awful and horrible scene." He explains: "[t]here was no
other alternative to make our voice heard by the world from the depths
of the detention centers except this way in order for the world to reexamine its standing [ ... ]." Dossari's attorney surmised that he required
134 President

Bush, quoted in Jonathan Karl, "'High-Value' Detainee's Transferred tQ Guantanamo," ABC News, at www.abcnews.go.com/lnternational/story?id=2400470.
135 Quoted in William Glaberson, "Arraigned, 9/n Defendants Talk of Martyrdom," June 6, 2oo8,
The New York Times. See Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, "The Unsacrificeable Subject?" in Austin
Sarat and Karl Shoemaker, eds., Wh9 Desen>es to Die? Constructing the Executable Subiect.
Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press (forthcoming 2009) Ch. 1.
136 The letter is available www.ccr-ny.org/V211egal/september_nth/docsjumaa_English.pdf. Ellipses are in original document. It is not apparent from the English translation whether it
was redacted.
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their audience "so that the military could not cover it up and his death
would not be anonymous."137 Dossari envisages that his "soul is leaving my
body to rise to its creator," and he asks that his attorney and interpreter
[t]ake some of my blood ... take pieces of my death shrouds ... take
some of my remains ... take pictures of my dead body when I
am placed in my grave, lonely ... send it to the world ... to the
judges ... to people with live consciences ... make them carry the
burden of guilt in front of the world for this soul that was wasted with
no guilt it has ever done ...
Dossari asks to be turned into a sacred relic, that his blood, shroud, remains,
and photos of his body be circulated throughout the world. In a stream
of images running parallel to the illicit photographs of victims from Abu
Ghraib wherein U.S. soldiers recorded their own theatre with detainee
bodies, Dossari establishes himself as the director of his own performance,
one intended to "burden" anyone with a "conscience."
Dossari's death did not take place as he had envisaged, however: his
attorney, whom Dossari intended to serve as his witness, discovered Dossari
in a bathroom hanging from the ceiling by his neck, while a pool of blood
formed on the floor beneath him. The attorney interfered in the rite and
summoned the authorities. Dossari's life was saved, his ritual preempted,
and no photos circulated showing his gruesome state. 138 On the other
hand, Dossari's efforts were not unnoticed: his attorney has recounted the
dramatic story numerous times in media outlets. Dossari's letter has been
widely qistributed, is included in a book of poems from Guantanamo, and
is recited on YouTube. 139

Conclusion
The types of action that are recognized as sacrificial are, necessarily, controlled and fraught. In a world with much pain, states attempt to draw out
137 Quoted

in Josh White, "Suicidal Guantanamo Inmate Moved out oflsolation," The Washing-

ton Post, Dec. 17, 2005.
138 Josh White, "Guantanamo Desperation Seen in Suicide Attempts: One Incident Was During
Lawyer's Visit," The Washington Post, Nov. 1, 2005; see also Margolis, Guantdnamo, 212-214

(describing that "Jumah tried to kill himself again, this time by attempting to reopen the gash
he had made a month earlier").
139 Mark F alkoff, ed., Poems from Guantdnamo: The Detainees Speak. Iowa City: University oflowa
Press (2007); YouTube reading at http://youtube.com/watch?v=6qtak0xnfoo&feature=user.
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some portion as sacrificial, as invoking larger meanings that involve the
collectivity. A series of divides and explanatory devices assist in deciding
whose suffering is to be recognized and the type of recognition granted. I
have not addressed two of the most powerful constructs that channel how
our legal and social order frames suffering: the accident and a statistical
conception of events. Both divert attention from human and divine agency
as explanatory frameworks for understanding misfortune. There is nothing inherently "accidental" about accidents, however, as Guido Calabresi
pointed out long ago. They arise from an implicit or explicit policy choices
to accept certain losses.i4°
This chapter has explored legal and policy forms that organize suffering
as meaningful and meaningless for the U.S. public - whether it is the
use of private military contractors, a description of the soldiers' sacrifice
as private and belonging to the family, or the exclusion of detainees from
the normal legal order. These are interesting cases because the effort to
construct these losses as insignificant seems difficult and in some cases
runs contrary to extremely deep national traditions.
In the examples that I have explored, designations that officials have
established are challenged. In the military contractor context, a policy of
subcontracting and privatization seems overwhelmed by the spectacle of
the attack on the contractors who are then resacralized. The state's attempt
to unbundle itself from sacred meanings is not entirely successful. My
account of the privatization, this time to the family sphere, of a soldier's
death, is challenged by Cindy Sheehan's ability to take the role of a grieving
mother, privately comforted by the president for her son's death, into the
public sphere. Her actions, linked to widespread underlying doubts about
the meaningfulness of the Iraq war and the disproportion between its
justification and her son's death, opened up the question whether his death
was sacred or banal. My detainee example shows the struggle between the
United States trying to hold onto a framework of exclusion from ordinary
law and the efforts of the prisoners to claim a position for normal treatment.
Judging by the response of authorities, the detainees were not mistaken
about the potential efficacy of their acts.
140 Guido Calabresi, "The
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In each of these cases, the event potentially exceeds the capacity of
the legal and cultural framework to contain the deep meaning that these
actors (and their audiences) find in destruction. Although this potential is
palpable, it is not necessarily realized. The detainees' efforts are met with
the policy of force-feeding and the construction of a maximum-security
detention facility. The legal position of the contractors has been changing
rapidly as of this writing, and this can be traced in part to the Blackwater
scandal. It is hard to point to a specific legal or policy change stemming
from Cindy Sheehan's efforts, but she did mobilize antiwar sentiment.
A focus on sacrifice draws attention to a form of meaningful loss and violence that seems hard to grasp with other terms. We could adopt another
vocabulary - of grotesque violence against contractors, of an outraged
mother, of a desperate detainee - but this would leave unexamined the
various transactional forms in each case. We could consider another register of meaningful loss. Criminal liability, for instance, also appears in each
of my examples. Just as sacrifice was a form of meaning that came in and
out of focus in each case, so was homicide.
We have encountered recent attempts to hide and privatize various forms
of loss and violence. The examples presented in this chapter suggest some
of the difficulty entailed in constructing the character whose suffering is
meaningless. It could be then that we see in these instances a portrait of the
United States attempting to shed the liability that is implied by recognizing
a loss as a sacrifice.

